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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Amalea ('Amalea') and the Republic of Ritania
('Ritania') have consented to submit this dispute to the International Court
of Justice ('this Court'), in accordance with Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice ('the Statute'), by way of
Compromis transmitted to the Registrar on 17 September 2013. Amalea and
Ritania have undertaken to accept this Court's decision as final and binding
on them and commit to comply with it in its entirety and in good faith.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Ritania's conduct concerning the Excelsior Island project was
in contravention of international law and whether Ritania is liable to
compensate Amalea for the economic losses caused by the landslide.
II. Whether Amalea has exclusive ownership of the Cargast and all
artifacts recovered from it and whether Ritania's deployment of naval
patrol vessels to the Cargast was in contravention of international law.
III. Whether Amalea's pursuit of Luz into Ritania's uncontested EEZ, and
his subsequent arrest, were in compliance with international law.
IV. Whether Amalea had jurisdiction to prosecute and convict Luz for
criminal conduct in connection with the Rosehill incident and whether
Amalea is required to return Luz to Ritania.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amalea, Ritania and the Strait of Malachi
Amalea, a developing State, and Ritania, a developed State, are
separated by the Strait of Malachi, which is between 217 and 386 nautical
miles ('nm') wide. In 1958, Amalea claimed a 12 nm contiguous zone,
which it extended to 24 nm in 1984. In 1983 and 1984, the States claimed
overlapping 200 nm exclusive economic zones ('EEZs') in the Strait of
Malachi.
Natural Resources in the Strait of Malachi
The waters of the Strait of Malachi contain fish stocks of critical
importance to Amalea. Amalean fishing vessels historically plied almost all
of the Strait of Malachi. The Amalean fishing industry contributes 40% of
Amaleans' protein intake, its exports comprise 5% of Amalea's GDP, and it
employs over 250,000 people. The Dorian wrasse is a non-migratory fish
which breeds in a 50 square kilometre area of the Sirius Plateau, which is
located in the Strait of Malachi. Amaleans traditionally consume the Dorian
wrasse at cultural ceremonies. Amalea's Dorian wrasse exports were
projected to generate USD 250 million annually between 2013 and 2018.
The seabed of the Strait of Malachi contains natural gas reserves of interest
to Ritania. In 1988, a natural gas deposit in the Strait of Malachi, the Erebus
gas field, was discovered.
The Malachi Gap Treaty
In 1992, to manage their overlapping EEZ claims, the States
concluded the Malachi Gap Treaty. The Malachi Gap Treaty apportioned
each State's rights within an area called the Malachi Gap. Amalea was
entitled to the natural resources of the waters and Ritania was entitled to the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil. The area claimed by each State
outside the Malachi Gap was considered its uncontested EEZ.
The Development of Excelsior Island
Esmeralda Kali ('Kali') is a Ritanian billionaire. In 2006, Kali
announced that her company, Excelsior Island Gas & Power ('EIGP'),
planned to create an artificial island to facilitate production of liquefied
natural gas ('LNG') sourced from the seabed of the Malachi Gap. The
island, called Excelsior Island, was to be constructed in Ritania's
uncontested EEZ using two billion cubic metres of sand and rock dredged
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entirely from the Malachi Gap. Ritania's Ambassador confirmed to
Amalea's Foreign Minister that Ritania was considering the feasibility of
the development. Amalea disputed any development of Excelsior Island
without its consent.
EIGP submitted an environmental impact assessment ('EIA') to the
Ritanian Department of Resource Management ('DRM') for approval of the
Excelsior Island development. That EIA did not consider the effects of
dredging on the waters or fish of the Malachi Gap. Amalea protested any
development of Excelsior Island without a comprehensive EIA being
conducted. After the DRM received the EIA, the International League for
Sustainable Aquaculture ('ILSA'), a non-governmental organisation,
published a report characterising the effects of dredging in the Malachi Gap
as potentially 'catastrophic'. Ritania's Ambassador refused Amalea's
Foreign Minister's request to forward this report to the DRM.
Amalea cautioned Ritania that if the dispute could not be resolved
through negotiations, it would request provisional measures from this
Court. Negotiations commenced and continued for a year. Within weeks of
the negotiations stalling, the DRM authorised EIGP's development of
Excelsior Island. This Court declined Amalea's request for provisional
measures.
The Landslide and Endangerment of the Dorian Wrasse
In December 2009, the dredging in the Malachi Gap caused an
unprecedented landslide in the Sirius Plateau. That landslide increased
water turbidity and gas concentration in the Sirius Plateau, harming the
Dorian wrasse population. By 2011, Amalea's Dorian wrasse catch had
reduced to 15% of its catch in 2000. In February 2012, ILSA declared the
Dorian wrasse endangered. In March 2012, following ILSA's
recommendation, Amalea ceased commercial fishing.
The Discovery and Salvage of the Cargast
In January 2010, the Cargast was discovered in the Malachi Gap on
Amalea's continental shelf. The Cargast was an Amalean schooner bearing
the escutcheon of the King of Amalea, equipped with cannons and weapons
provided by the King and purchased by the Treasury. The Cargast was
granted to Baldric Verdigris ('Verdigris'), an Amalean explorer who held a
letter of marque from the King of Amalea 'to bring glory to the Kingdom'.
In March 1510, after a successful overseas trading mission, Verdigris and
his crew sacked Ritania's capital, Helios, seizing cultural artifacts,
including the Sacred Helian Coronet ('Coronet'). The Cargast sank in the
Strait of Malachi during her return to Amalea.
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Amalea claimed ownership of the Cargast and its cargo, 'to be held in
trust for all humankind.' A Swiss diver, Milo Bellezza ('Bellezza'),
conducted an exploratory dive to the Cargast, where he recovered five
objects, one of which appeared to be the Coronet. Bellezza provided
information that persuaded Amalea's Cultural Affairs Ministry ('ACMA')
that the Cargast's hull structure was at risk of catastrophic collapse.
Amalea contracted with Bellezza to explore the Cargast and recover
objects, granting him the status of salvor. Ritania protested the salvage of
the Cargast and counter-claimed ownership of the artifacts, threatening to
commence naval patrols to prevent further interference. From June to
September 2011, Bellezza conducted further dives, recovering items for
Amalea from both the trading mission and the Sack of Helios. In September
2011, Ritania commenced naval patrols around the Cargast.
The Rosehill Incident
The Rosehill was an Amalean-registered cruise ship carrying 771
people. The Daedalus was a stolen Ritanian-flagged yacht, operated by
Oscar de Luz ('Luz'), a Ritanian citizen. In February 2011, as the Rosehill
approached Excelsior Island, the Daedalus was speeding on a collision
course with the Rosehill. The captain of the Rosehill was forced to swerve
into Excelsior Island to avoid a collision. The impact caused the death of
127 people, including 89 Amaleans; 117 people died on board the Rosehill
and 10 Amaleans were found dead in the water nearby. The Rosehill
captain immediately radioed Amalean authorities.
The Pursuit, Apprehension and Prosecution of Luz
Following the Rosehill incident, Luz navigated the Daedalus towards
Amalea. The Amalean Coastal Protection Service ('ACPS') issued an alert
that the Daedalus was stolen, endangering Amalean fishing vessels and
suspected of human trafficking. Captain Haddock, the commander of the
Icarus, an Amalean Navy Cutter, received that alert. The Icarus identified
the Daedalus on radar within about 23 nm of Amalea and set out to
intercept her. When the vessels were within visual range, Captain Haddock
issued a radio broadcast ordering the Daedalus to stop. Instead, the
Daedalus turned towards Ritania, where she was pursued by the Icarus into
Ritania's EEZ. In an attempt to force the Icarus to veer away, Luz steered
the Daedalus into a head-on collision with the Icarus. Luz leapt into a
dinghy, where he was arrested.
Amalea prosecuted and convicted Luz for murder, reckless
endangerment, negligent operation of a vessel and property crimes.
Amalea's criminal legislation specifically includes offences committed in
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the Malachi Gap. Amalea declined a request by Ritania to repatriate Luz,
commenting that Ritanian criminal legislation does not apply
extraterritorially.
Relevant Conventions
The States are both Parties to the Salvage Convention and the Geneva
Conventions. Amalea is a Party to the UCHC and a signatory to UNCLOS.
Ritania is a signatory to the UCHC and a Party to UNCLOS. There is no
extradition treaty between the States.
ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
PLEADING I
As Ritania has not challenged Amalea's standing, for the Court to
decide that issue would be non ultra petita. In any case, Amalea has
standing to make claims concerning Ritania's conduct.
PLEADING II
Ritania's conduct concerning the Excelsior Island development
contravened international law.
Ritania contravened the Malachi Gap Treaty both because it exercised
its treaty rights in a way which unduly inhibited Amalea's capacity to
exercise its treaty rights and because it did not cooperate with Amalea
giving due regard to Amalea's interests. Further, Ritania breached the
obligation to exercise due diligence to ensure that the development of
Excelsior Island did not cause reasonably foreseeable and significant
damage to the Malachi Gap. Additionally, Ritania contravened the abuse of
rights doctrine because it exercised its rights in a way which impaired the
capacity of Amalea to exercise its rights, and contravened the principle of
sustainable development because it did not integrate environmental
considerations into its development approval process.
Ritania is liable to compensate Amalea for the economic losses caused
by the landslide. Ritania is liable on an at-fault basis because it has
committed internationally wrongful acts. In the alternative, Ritania is liable
on an objective basis even if it has not committed internationally wrongful
acts.
PLEADING III
Amalea has exclusive ownership of the Cargast and all artifacts
recovered from it. Amalea owned the Cargast and its artifacts and did not
abandon them. The Cargast was a State vessel and Amalea remained her
lawful owner despite her sinking in 1510. As Amalea acquired the artifacts
lawfully according to the rules governing warfare in 1510, they remained
Amalean property. Further, as Amalea is the owner of the Cargast, it was
entitled to authorise the salvage of the Cargast and was not prevented by
any rule of international law from contracting with Bellezza to recover
items from the wreck.
Ritania's deployment of naval patrol vessels to the Cargast
contravened international law. Ritania violated the prohibition on the threat
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of force and other Charter obligations. Ritania's actions were not valid law
enforcement measures. Ritania violated the freedom of navigation in the
EEZ and cannot rely on any UCHC provisions to justify its conduct.
PLEADING IV
Amalea's pursuit of Luz into Ritania's EEZ was in compliance with
international law. Amalea satisfied the requirements for hot pursuit in the
High Seas Convention. The proper interpretation of the relevant convention
provisions does not require the Daedalus to have committed an offence
within Amalea's territorial sea to justify the commencement of pursuit by
the Icarus. Accordingly, it was lawful for Amalea to pursue the Daedalus,
as it had good reason to believe that the Daedalus had violated Amalean
immigration law in its contiguous zone or was about to do so in its
territorial sea. The Icarus also complied with the requirement to issue a
signal to stop, for which the use of radio is not prohibited and all other
conditions for pursuit were satisfied. Alternatively, Amalea validly
exercised the customary right of hot pursuit from the EEZ for suspected
navigational offences within Amalea's EEZ.
Following its hot pursuit, Amalea was lawfully entitled to arrest Luz.
In the alternative, Amalea had adequate grounds to arrest Luz on suspicions
of piracy. Luz's intentional navigation of the Daedalus into a collision
course with the Icarus constituted an illegal act of violence against another
vessel, providing adequate grounds to suspect the vessel of piracy.
PLEADING V
Amalea had jurisdiction to prosecute and convict Luz for criminal
conduct in connection with the Rosehill incident. Amalea's exercise of
jurisdiction over Luz was lawful. Even if the Court finds that Luz's arrest
was unlawful, Amalea was not precluded from prosecuting him.
No rule of international law prohibited Amalea from exercising
jurisdiction over Luz in connection with the Rosehill incident. Additionally,
Amalea can show existing permissive grounds in international law to
support its prescriptive jurisdiction. Amalea has no obligation to make
reparation to Ritania. However, if the Court should find that reparation is
due, repatriation of Luz would not be the proper form of restitution. This is
because Amalea may continue to hold Luz for his offences in connection
with the Icarus, which Ritania has not challenged.
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PLEADINGS
I. AMALEA HAS STANDING TO MAKE CLAIMS CONCERNING RITANIA'S
CONDUCT
Ritania cannot contest Amalea's standing. Given that Ritania has not
challenged Amalea's standing, for the Court to decide this issue would be
non ultra petita.' In any case, Amalea has standing as it is an injured State.
As to the Excelsior Island development, Ritania owed obligations to
Amalea individually under the Malachi Gap Treaty, and to a group of
States including Amalea under customary international law and general
principles of law.2 As to the Cargast, Ritania owed obligations to Amalea
individually under the Salvage Convention, and to a group of States
including Amalea under the Charter and customary international law.3
Regarding the obligations of a collective character, Amalea was specially
affected by their breach.4
II. RITANIA'S CONDUCT CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXCELSIOR
ISLAND CONTRAVENED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RITANIA IS LIABLE TO
COMPENSATE AMALEA FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES CAUSED BY THE LANDSLIDE
A. Ritania's conduct concerning the development ofExcelsior Island
contravened conventional international law
1. Ritania's conduct concerning the development of Excelsior Island
contravened the Malachi Gap Treaty
a. Ritania contravened Article 12(c) because it 'unduly inhibited'
Amalea's rights
Articles 12(a) and 12(b) of the Malachi Gap Treaty entitle Amalea to
'explore, exploit, and protect the natural resources of the waters superfacent
to the seabed' and entitle Ritania to 'explore, exploit, and protect the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil' of the Malachi Gap.5 Further, Article
12(c) of the Malachi Gap Treaty provides that neither Party is to exercise
those rights 'in a manner which unduly inhibits the exercise of the rights of
1. Statute art 36(1).
2. ASR art 42(a).
3. ASR art 42(a).
4. ASR art 42(b)(i).
5. Compromis, Appendix B.
[Vol. 2 1:1
Distinguished Brief
the other Party'.6 The development of Excelsior Island was an exercise of
Ritania's Article 12(b) Malachi Gap Treaty rights and so enlivened the
responsibilities imposed on it by Article 12(c) of that treaty.
'Unduly inhibit' is not defined in the Malachi Gap Treaty.
Interpretation of that phrase shall be 'in good faith, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.'" The object and purpose of the
Malachi Gap Treaty was 'to balance, and ... to promote, the interests of the
States Parties in respect of exploration, exploitation, and protection of [the
Malachi Gap].' 8 An undue inhibition, in the context of dredging for the
Excelsior Island development, is one where the disadvantages to Amalea
outweigh the advantages to Ritania. For Ritania, the Excelsior Island
development would have economic advantages.9 For Amalea, the Excelsior
Island development caused the Dorian wrasse to become endangered,
threatened the continuation of its cultural customs and destroyed the Dorian
wrasse industry.' 0 The imbalance between the advantages to Ritania and the
disadvantages to Amalea was so considerable that Ritania's exercise of its
right to develop Excelsior Island constituted an undue inhibition of
Amalea's exercise of its rights, in contravention of Article 12(c) of the
Malachi Gap Treaty.
b. Ritania contravened Article 12(d) because it did not 'cooperate' with
Amalea and accord Amalea's interests 'due regard'
Article 12(d) of the Malachi Gap Treaty requires the Parties to
'cooperate with each other in relation to the exercise of their respective
rights giving due regard to each Party's unique interests in the Malachi
Gap'."1 Neither 'cooperate' nor 'due regard' are defined in the Malachi Gap
Treaty. Interpretation of those phrases shall be in accordance with the
general rule of treaty interpretation set out above.12 The ordinary meaning
of the word 'cooperate' is to engage in co-ordinated action so as to attain a
certain objective.13 Cooperating with Amalea required Ritania to engage in
co-ordinated communications, consultations and negotiations to achieve the
6. Compromis, Appendix B.
7. VCLTart31(1).
8. Compromis, [16]. The preamble also forms part of the treaty's context: VCLTart 31(2).
9. Compromis, [20].
10. Compromis, [18], [30], [50].
11. Compromis, Appendix B.
12. VCLTart31(1).
13. Wolfrum (2012) 783.
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parties' common goal of balancing and promoting their interests in the
Malachi Gap. The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'due regard' is
comparable with that of the phrase 'reasonable regard'.1 Giving reasonable
regard to Amalea's interests required Ritania to be cognisant of Amalea's
interests, consider Amalea's interests in its decision-making, 5 and
reconcile the States' interests so that they could co-exist.16
Ritania did not engage in negotiations with Amalea so as to achieve
the parties' common goal. Ritania only initiated negotiations with Amalea
after Amalea advised Ritania of its intention to apply for provisional
measures from this Court. Ritania was not cognisant of Amalea's unique
interests in the Dorian wrasse and other fish, nor did it consider those
interests in its decision-making and reconcile those interests so that they
could co-exist. Despite Amalea informing Ritania of its concerns about the
effect of the dredging on the Dorian wrasse,17 Ritania refused to take the
ILSA report into account in its development approval process, and
approved an EIA that did not contemplate the impact of dredging activities
on the Dorian wrasse.18 Ritania did not cooperate with Amalea, giving due
regard to Amalea's unique interests, in contravention of Article 12(d) of the
Malachi Gap Treaty.
B. Ritania's conduct concerning the development ofExcelsior Island
contravened customary international law
1. Ritania's conduct concerning the development of Excelsior Island
contravened its obligation to exercise due diligence
a. Ritania had an obligation to exercise due diligence
At custom, States have a responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.19 This 'no-
harm' rule20 is an accepted 'part of the corpus of international law
14. Annotated US Naval Operations Handbook (1997) 2-21-2-22; Beckman and Davenport
(2012) 14.
15. UNCLOS Commentary, vol 3, 86; Walker, G. (2011) 187.
16. Fisheries Jurisdiction, [69].
17. Compromis, [24].
18. Compromis, [23]-[25].
19. Nuclear Weapons, [29]; Pulp Mills, [101]; Trail Smelter, 1965; Corfu Channel, 22.
20. The 'no-harm' rule is a manifestation of sic utere, the good neighbourliness principle and
abuse of rights: Beyerlin and Marauhn (2011) 40.
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[concerning] the environment.' 21 The 'no-harm' rule obliges States to
exercise due diligence concerning activities within their jurisdiction or
control where there is a likelihood that those activities will cause
reasonably foreseeable and significant damage to areas beyond their
national control.22 Ritania had an obligation to exercise due diligence to
ensure that the development of Excelsior Island did not cause reasonably
foreseeable and significant damage to the Malachi Gap.
'Reasonable foreseeability' is contingent on the magnitude and
probability of harm,23 which is conditioned by 'the state of knowledge
regarding the risk posed by the activity in question'24 at the date of
decision-making. Significant harm is more than minor or 'detectable but
less than serious or substantial.25 Further, the effect of the precautionary
principle is that a State cannot excuse its failure to mitigate or avoid
significant environmental damage on the basis of a lack of complete
scientific certainty.2 6
At the time of EIA approval, the proposed dredging for the
development of Excelsior Island consisted of two billion cubic metres of
sand and rock,27 and was the world's largest dredging activity.2 8 Prominent
marine scientists had predicted that 'any major dredging activity in the
Malachi Gap ... could potentially prove catastrophic for native species and
ecosystems ... [and] could threaten particularly grave damage.' 29 The
dredging was proximate to the only known breeding ground of the non-
migratory Dorian wrasse.3 0 Collectively, these facts meant that harm both to
the Malachi Gap generally, and to the Dorian wrasse specifically, was
reasonably foreseeable and significant.
The fact that the Court rejected Amalea's application for provisional
measures does not mean that damage to the Malachi Gap was not
reasonably foreseeable and significant. A criterion for the indication of
provisional measures is that there is a necessity for this Court to prevent
21. Nuclear Weapons, [29]; Koivurova (2010) [15].
22. Trail Smelter, 1965; Corfu Channel, 22; Nuclear Weapons, [29]; Pulp Mills, [101];
Activities in the Area, [110].
23. Draft Articles on Prevention ofTransboundary Harm arts 1-2; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell
(2009) 153.
24. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (2009) 153.
25. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transhoundary Harm art 2.
26. Request for an Examination of the Situation in the Nuclear Tests, 342-343.
27. Compromis, [20].
28. Ouis (2011) 1413.
29. Compromis, [25].
30. Compromis, [ 19], [24]; Clarifications, [2].
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'irreparable damage'. 31 That test constitutes a higher threshold than
'significant' damage. This Court's previous denial of provisional
measures32 does not necessitate the conclusion that damage to the Malachi
Gap was not reasonably foreseeable and significant.
As the damage to the Malachi Gap was both reasonably foreseeable
and significant, Ritania had an obligation to exercise due diligence. The
procedural implications of Ritania's obligation to exercise due diligence
were conditioned by the circumstances: '[t]oute d6termination du degr6 de
diligence exig6 par le droit international doit tenir compte: a) de
l'organisation du droit inteme exig6e par le droit international, b) de
l'emploi des moyens dont l'Etat dispose, c) des soins que l'Etat doit
apporter A la mise en ceuvre de ces moyens.' 3 3At a minimum, to fulfil the
obligation to exercise due diligence, Ritania had to have had the legal and
administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure compliance with its
international environmental responsibilities and use that infrastructure with
34diligence appropriate in the circumstances. However, as Ritania was a
developed State with the capacity to take precautions against environmental
damage, the standard of due diligence required increased commensurately.
Due diligence required Ritania to use 'all the means at its disposal' 35 to
ensure the development of Excelsior Island did not cause significant
damage to the Malachi Gap. Ritania, a developed and industrialised State
with considerable means at its disposal did not utilise those means, as set
out below.
b. Ritania breached its obligation to exercise due diligence because it
approved a deficient EIA for the development of Excelsior Island
The fact that Ritania required an EIA for the Excelsior Island
development was not sufficient to satisfy its due diligence obligation.36 To
satisfy its due diligence obligation, the content that Ritania needed to
require of that EIA had to reflect 'the nature and magnitude of the proposed
development [of Excelsior Island] and its likely adverse impact on the
31. Statute art 41; Fisheries Jurisdiction, 12, 16, 30, 34; Nicaragua v Costa Rica (Provisional
Measures), [24]-[25]; Rosenne (2006) 1383.
32. Statute art 75(3); Compromis, [27].
33. Zannas (1952) 85-86.
34. Tehran Hostages, [63]; Dupuy (1977) 372-374; Zannas (1952) 85.
35. Nuclear Weapons, [29].
36. The requirement to conduct an EIA can also be conceived of as a discrete obligation in
customary international environmental law: Pulp Mills, [204].
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environment' of the Malachi Gap. The nature and magnitude of the
proposed development of Excelsior Island were so considerable that non-
contemplation of the impact of the dredging on the waters and fish species
of the Malachi Gap 8 rendered EIGP's EIA deficient. Ritania's approval of
this deficient EIA was inconsistent with its obligation to exercise due
diligence. Further, Ritania could not approve an EIA which did not consider
alternative locations for the dredging activities. 3 9 There is no indication that
the EIGP EIA considered any other locations for the dredging activities,
especially locations less proximate to the breeding ground of the Dorian
wrasse.
c. Ritania breached its obligation to exercise due diligence because it did
not notify and inform Amalea of the proposal for the development of
Excelsior Island
Due diligence required Ritania to directly notify and inform Amalea of
the pertinent details of the proposal40 for the Excelsior Island development
as soon as this proposal was referred to Ritania 'with the aim of obtaining
initial environmental authorisation'. 4 1 Kali's announcement 42 cannot be
considered a sufficient substitute for inter-governmental notification and
information. Ritania did not directly notify and inform Amalea of the
proposal until after the feasibility of the proposal was already 'under
review' by the Ritanian government.4 3
d. Ritania breached its obligation to exercise due diligence because it did
not cooperate with Amalea concerning the proposal for the development of
Excelsior Island
Due diligence required Ritania to cooperate4 4 (through consultation
and negotiation) in good faith with Amalea about the proposed construction
of Excelsior Island.4 5 Although this did not require the States to reach an
37. Pulp Mills, [205].
38. Compromis, [23].
39. Pulp Mills, [207]-[214].
40. Pulp Mills, [110].
41. Pulp Mills, [105].
42. Compromis, [20].
43. Compromis, [21].
44. The requirement to cooperate can also be conceived of as a discrete obligation in
customary international environmental law: MOXPlant, [82].
45. MOXPlant, [82]; Lake Lanoux, [ 101].
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46 diagreement, it did oblige them to negotiate with a view to reaching an
agreement and to conduct themselves so that negotiations were meaningful.
This could not have been the case if Ritania 'insist[ed] upon its own
position without contemplating any modification of it'.47 Ritania's conduct
did not indicate that it contemplated any modification of its position: it was
non-responsive to Amalea's concerns conveyed following Kali's
announcement of the development; it refused to consider the ILSA report; it
did not initiate negotiations until it was notified of Amalea's intent to seek
provisional measures from the Court; and it prevented any
recommencement of the negotiations by approving the EIA within weeks of
the negotiations stalling.48
e. Ritania breached its obligation to exercise due diligence because it did
not conduct environmental monitoring during the development ofExcelsior
Island
After authorising the Excelsior Island development, due diligence
required Ritania to conduct continuous environmental monitoring.49 There
is no evidence that Ritania conducted any environmental monitoring during
the development of Excelsior Island.
C. Ritania's conduct concerning the development ofExcelsior Island
contravened general principles of law
1. Ritania's conduct constituted an abuse of rights
The doctrine of abuse of rights is a general principle of law 50 and is
typically applied in cases of shared resources.5' An abuse of rights occurs,
inter alia, if one State exercises its rights in a way that impairs the capacity
of a second State to exercise its rights, and the disadvantages caused to the
second State exceed the advantages received by the first State.52 By
authorising dredging in the Malachi Gap that caused significant harm to at
least one fish species of critical cultural and economic importance to
Amalea, Ritania exercised its rights to exploit the natural resources of the
46. Railway Traffic, [31]; Application ofCERD, [158].
47. North Sea Continental Shelf [85]; Gablikovo-Nagymaros, [141].
48. Compromis, [21], [25]-[27].
49. Gabjikovo-Nagymaros, 111-112 (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
50. Gabjikovo-Nagymaros, 95 (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry); US-
Shrimp, [158]; Cheng (1953) 121; Byers (2002) 397.
51. Byers (2002) 424.
52. Oppenheim (1955) 345; Byers (2002) 406.
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seabed in a way that impaired the capacity of Amalea to exploit the natural
resources of the waters. There is doubt as to whether the Dorian wrasse
population will recover before the end of this century,13 so the effect of this
abuse of rights is long-lasting. As Amalea is a developing State, the
disadvantages to Amalea are considerable; the Dorian wrasse is central to
Amalean cultural customs and the Amalean economy. 4 These
disadvantages exceed the unspecified economic advantages to Ritania of
the development of Excelsior Island.
2. Ritania contravened the principle of sustainable development
The principle of sustainable development is a general principle of law
which requires States to balance 'environmental considerations [with]
developmental considerations'." The principle of sustainable development
is 'a part of modern international law [both because of] its inescapable
logical necessity ... [and] its wide and general acceptance by the global
community.'56 The principle of sustainable development required Ritania to
integrate environmental considerations into its economic development
approval process5 and adopt 'appropriate environmental measures'.
Ritania's approval of the EIGP EIA, which failed to address the waters or
fish species of the Malachi Gap, constituted a failure to integrate
environmental protection into its development approval process. As Ritania
was not cognisant of the environmental effects of the Excelsior Island
development, it was necessarily incapable of taking appropriate
environmental measures.
D. Ritania is liable to compensate Amalea for economic losses caused by
the landslide
1. Ritania is liable to compensate Amalea on an at fault basis
Ritania is obliged to make full reparation for any injury caused by its
internationally wrongful acts, provided that those acts were the proximate
cause of Amalea's losses.60 The connection between the landslide and
53. Compromis, [30].
54. Compromis, [1], [3], [18], [50].
55. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), 88-95.
56. Gabjikovo-Nagymaros (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), 88-95.
57. Gabikovo-Nagymaros (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), 88.
58. Iron Rhine Arbitration, [59].
59. Factory at Chorzdw (Jurisdiction), 19; ASR art 3 1(1).
60. Administrative Decision No II, 30.
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Amalea's economic losses was sufficiently proximate to be considered
causative: the EIGP dredging caused the landslide in the Sirius Plateau; that
landslide increased water turbidity and gas dissociation in the breeding
ground of the Dorian wrasse; which in turn reduced the Dorian wrasse
population. 6' Further, Amalea is entitled to full compensation as it has not
contributed to its loss. In fact, Amalea has mitigated 62 its loss by ceasing
commercial exploitation of the Dorian wrasse to allow population
63
regeneration.
2. Ritania is liable to compensate Amalea on an objective basis
In the alternative, if Ritania has not committed an internationally
wrongful act, it is still liable to compensate Amalea on a sine delicto stricto
sensu basis. For liability to arise on a sine delicto stricto sensu basis, a State
must have known that a certain activity was being carried on within its
jurisdiction and control, and accepted the risk of liability (this is to be
assumed if a State has or should have knowledge of an activity and has not
prohibited it); the activity should be ultra-hazardous (by being 'abnormally
dangerous' or involving a 'significant risk'); and there should be a causal
link between the activity, the environmental interference, and the harm.64
Ritania permitted the development of Excelsior Island to occur by granting
EIGP a permit; the dredging involved a 'significant risk' to the Malachi
Gap; and there was a causal link between the dredging, the landslide and
the reduction in the Dorian wrasse population.
61. Compromis, [19], [28]-[30].
62. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros, [80]; ASR art 39.
63. Clarifications, [4].
64. Draft Principles on Hazardous Activities; Lefeber (1996) 149-150, 154; Crawford, Pellet
and Olleson (2010) 104.
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III. AMALEA HAS EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF THE WRECK OF THE CARGAST
AND ALL ARTIFACTS RECOVERED FROM IT, AND RITANIA'S DEPLOYMENT
OF NAVAL PATROL VESSELS TO THE SITE OF THE CARGASTCONTRAVENED
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Amalea has exclusive ownership of the wreck of the Cargast and all
artifacts recovered from it
1. Amalea owns the Cargast and all artifacts recovered from it, and did
not abandon them
a. Amalea owns the Cargast
The King of Amalea retained title to the Cargast. Although the
Cargast was 'granted' to Verdigris, this was for a specified use, 'to bring
glory to the Kingdom of Amalea'. 65 Accordingly, it remained Amalean
property. 6 The mere effluxion of time and lack of actual possession
following the sinking of a State vessel does not constitute abandonment by
its State owner.67 As the Cargast remained State property following its
grant to Verdigris, and was equipped for war by the State, there is a strong
presumption against dereliction. 8 In these circumstances, proof of
abandonment of the Cargast would have required an express statement of
abandonment by Amalea.69 There has been no such statement. To the
contrary, immediately after the discovery of the Cargast, Amalea expressly
reasserted its ownership of her.70 Accordingly, Amalea did not abandon the
Cargast and the wreck of the Cargast remains Amalean property.
. b. Amalea owns the artifacts recovered from the Cargast
UNCLOS, the Salvage Convention and the UCHC do not affect
ownership of property found at sea. Instead, according to intertemporal law,
the laws governing ownership of the artifacts at the time of the Cargast's
sinking in 1510 must be considered; a 'juridical fact must be appreciated in
the light of the law contemporary with it'. 71 According to the
65. Compromis, [32].
66. Moore (1906) vol 2, [252].
67. Oppenheim (1992) 1165; Mercedes, 1182; Institute of International Law (2007) 144, 151.
68. O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 913.
69. O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 913.
70. Compromis, [34].
71. Island ofPalmas, [845]; Elias (1980) 288.
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contemporaneous de jure belli, Verdigris acquired lawful ownership of the
artifacts.
In the 16" century, according to Grotius,72 de Victoria73 and Ayala,74
any booty seized by a belligerent in warfare became the lawful property of
the captor State,75 provided it was acquired following an authorisation of
hostilities and for a just cause. As to the requirement of just cause,
Brownlie states that between 1494 and 1648, the theory of just war
developed, 'according to which a war might be just on both sides, [with]
one prince believing in good faith that his cause was just when objectively
justice lay with the other party ... in substance therefore the just war
doctrine [was] deprived of any limiting effect.'76 Consequently, the legality
of Verdigris' hostilities in Helios were not open to substantive challenge
according to the law in 1510 provided that he held valid authorisation on
behalf of the King of Amalea.77 Verdigris' letter of marque constituted such
an authorisation. Letters of marque were historically only issued in
connection with an authorisation of hostilities against a sovereign 79 and
consisted of a commission by a sovereign to pursue hostilities
individually.80 As Verdigris had authorisation from the King of Amalea to
commit hostilities when he sacked Helios, the artifacts he seized became
the lawful property of Amalea.8 1
Subsequent change in the law regarding booty cannot affect Amalea's
initial acquisition of title.82 Intertemporal law cannot be relied upon to deny
Amalea's ownership of the vessel and the artifacts. As stated above, where
a sunken State vessel is concerned, lack of actual possession does not
undermine continuation of title over time. A State's title to its sunken vessel
encompasses both the wreck, as well as the cargo, since these are
inextricably linked.83
72. Grotius (1646) 663-671.
73. De Victoria (1557) 427-429.
74. Ayala (1582) 33.
75. Grotius (1646) 644; Gentili (1612) 315; Brownlie (1963) 11-12.
76. Brownlie (1963) 11-12.
77. Bynkershoek (1737) 136-137; Elagab (1988) 6-7.
78. Compromis, [32].
79. Moore (1906) vol 7, [1215]; Elagab (1988) 6-7.
80. Grotius (1604) 43; Grotius (1646) 788-789.
81. Island of Palmas, [845].
82. Island ofPalmas, [845].
83. Mercedes, 1182; The Brother Jonathan, 388-389.
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B. Amalea was entitled to salvage the Cargast and the artifacts
1. Amalea has the right to salvage the Cargast and the artifacts because
there is no relevant prohibitive rule
States' rights over wrecks in the EEZ are not regulated by UNCLOS or
the customary EEZ regime.84 Amalea is free, therefore, to exercise its right
to salvage wrecks in the EEZ provided there is no relevant prohibitive
rule.ss
a. Amalea's right to salvage was not affected by Article 59 of UNCLOS
For the purpose of UNCLOS, rights over wrecks in the EEZ are
unallocated, residual rights. Article 59 of UNCLOS proposes resolution of
conflicting claims to unallocated rights in the EEZ on an equitable basis.
Ritania cannot claim the benefit of having its interests taken into account on
an equitable basis in accordance with Article 59, as Amalea, a non-Party to
UNCLOS, is not bound by that provision. Further, Article 59 is not
customary.87
Even if Article 59 is reflective of custom, any equitable resolution of
conflicting interests would privilege Amalea's sovereign immunity over the
Cargast as a warship above any interest Ritania may have.88 The Cargast
was entitled to sovereign immunity as a warship because it was armed and
employed in the service of the King of Amalea to conduct hostilities.8 9
Amalea's rights would therefore prevail over Ritania's interests.
b. Amalea's right to salvage was not affected by underwater cultural
heritage provisions in UNCLOS
UNCLOS contains two provisions concerning underwater cultural
heritage: Article 149 and Article 303. As Amalea is not a Party to UNCLOS
it cannot be bound by either of those provisions. 90 Even if those provisions
are reflective of custom, they are not applicable in the circumstances.
Article 149 only concerns underwater cultural heritage located in 'the
Area', which refers to the deep seabed beyond a State's national
84. Churchill and Lowe (1999) 175; Brown (1977) 244.
85. Lotus, 19.
86. UNCLOS art 303(3); Caflisch (1982) 31.
87. Shearer (1986) 334.
88. Migliorino (1985) 257; Strati (1995) 287; Vadi (2013) 370.
89. See section II.A.1.b; Schooner Exchange, 117-118.
90. UNCLOS art 303(1); Compromis, [Il]; VCLT art 18.
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jurisdiction.9' This article is inapplicable as the Cargast was located in the
Malachi Gap, an area over which Amalea and Ritania share jurisdiction.92
Article 303(1) requires States to cooperate with respect to the protection of
archaeological and historical objects at sea. The duty to cooperate in Article
303(1) is not of a 'fundamentally norm creating character' 93 and so cannot
reflect custom. 9 4 Even if it is customary, the scope and content of the duty
to cooperate is not defined in Article 303(1) and is 'far too general and
vague to have any significant normative content' . Moreover, UNCLOS
provides that 'nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners
[or] the law of salvage'.9 Therefore, no relevant rule in UNCLOS affected
Amalea's right to salvage.
c. Amalea's right to salvage was not affected by underwater cultural
heritage provisions in the UCHC
As a non-party to the UCHC, Ritania cannot enforce the provisions of
that convention against Amalea. 97 Further, no relevant provisions of the
UCHC have yet attained customary status. In any case, Amalea's
activities directed at the Cargast were in conformity with the objectives and
general principles of the UCHC.99 First, preservation of the artifacts in situ
was not possible due to the danger posed by the imminent collapse of the
hull of the Cargast.100 Second, Amalea did not recover the objects for
commercial gain; to the contrary, it made a unilateral declaration that it
would hold the objects 'in trust for all humankind.'"o"
d. Amalea's right to salvage was not affected by the Malachi Gap Treaty
Ritania's right under the Malachi Gap Treaty to 'explore, exploit and
protect the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil' 0 2 does not
91. UNCLOS arts 1, 134, 149.
92. Compromis, [31], Appendix B.
93. North Sea Continental Shelf 43.
94. Caflisch (1982) 20.
95. Caflisch (1982) 20.
96. UNCLOS art 303(3).
97. Compromis, [52]; Free Zones, 96; Chinkin (1993) 54-56.
98. Dromgoole (2013) 359, 367; Forrest (2010) 361.
99. UCHC art 2.
100. Compromis, [36].
101. Compromis, [34].
102. Compromis, Appendix B.
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encompass non-natural resources, including shipwrecks. 03 Consequently,
the Malachi Gap Treaty does not affect Amalea's entitlement to salvage the
Cargast.
2. Amalea's salvage was lawful because it complied with the Salvage
Convention
The Salvage Convention applies in this case. A State may make a
reservation under that convention to exclude 'maritime cultural property of
prehistoric, archaeological or historic interest' 0 4 from its ambit. Neither
Amalea nor Ritania have made such a reservation, therefore the artifacts are
subject to the law of salvage.105 Under the Salvage Convention, Amalea, the
sovereign owner of the Cargast, was solely entitled to control and direct
recovery of the wreck and its artifacts.' 0 6 Further, Amalea conducted a valid
salvage operation under the ambit of the Salvage Convention. The Cargast
met the requirement in the convention that the property be 'in danger', as
her hull structure was at risk of catastrophic collapse. 0 7
C. Ritania's deployment ofpatrol vessels to the site of the Cargast
contravened international law
At custom, military activities in another State's EEZ are only
permitted to the extent that those activities do not violate any relevant rules
of international law. 0 8 As set out below, Ritania has violated such rules.
1. Ritania's actions were not valid law enforcement measures
In Guyana v Suriname it was held that force used in law enforcement
activities must have a lawful jurisdictional base and be 'unavoidable,
reasonable and necessary' in the circumstances. 09 In these circumstances,
Ritania had no protective jurisdiction over the wreck" 0 and the deployment
was not unavoidable, reasonable and necessary. The patrols therefore must
be assessed according to the laws concerning the use of force.
103. VCLTart 31(3)(c); ILC Yearbook, 1956, volII, 298; Caflisch (1982) 14.
104. Salvage Convention.art 30(1)(d).
105. Salvage Convention arts 1, 2; VCLT art 26.
106. Salvage Convention arts 4, 19.
107. Salvage Convention art 1; Simon v Taylor, 344; Brice (2011) 44.
108. UNCLOS art 87; Charter art 2(4); Corfu Channel, 35.
109. Guyana v Suriname, [445]; M/VSaiga, [156].
110. Guyana v Suriname, [445].
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2. Ritania violated the prohibition on the threat of force and the
obligation to settle disputes peacefully
Ritania's deployment of naval patrol vessels constituted a threat of
force directed against Amalea. A threat of force 'against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any [S]tate, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN' is prohibited by the Charter and
custom."' The phrases 'political independence' and 'territorial integrity'
should not be read as qualifying the general prohibition on the use of force
in Article 2(4).' 12 In the absence of the exceptions of Chapter VII
authorisation, or self-defence, the prohibition on the threat of force is
absolute."'
Ritania's threatened interference with Amalea's sovereign right to
exercise dominion over its property, the Cargast, constituted a threat of
force against Amalea.114 The Permanent Court of Arbitration held in
Guyana v Suriname,"5 that Suriname's deployment of naval patrols to an
area of overlapping EEZs to remove rig workers operating under a
Guyanese licence constituted a threat of force. Similarly, Ritania's
deployment, coupled with governmental statements that the patrols would
be aimed at physically preventing any access to the Cargast,"6 constituted
a threat of force. That the governmental statements were made prior to the
commencement of the actual patrols does not detract from their threatening
nature. Ritania cannot rely on any exceptions to the threat of force to excuse
its conduct. Further, the patrols were necessarily a violation of the
obligation to settle disputes peacefully because Ritania had not engaged in
negotiations with Amalea in relation to the Cargast prior to the deployment
of the vessels." 7
3. Ritania violated the freedom of navigation in the EEZ
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention obliges States to give
'reasonable regard' to the interests of all other States in exercising their
freedom of navigation on the high seas. The subsequent development of
custom extended this freedom of navigation to the EEZ."' 8 Ritania's
111. Charter art 2(4); Nuclear Weapons, [47]-[48]; Nicaragua (Merits), [188].
112. Charter art 2(4); Brownlie (1963) 265-268; Franck (2002) 12; Guilfoyle (2009) 273.
113. Charter art 2(4), cf arts 42, 51; Corfu Channel, 35.
114. Corfu Channel, 35; Friendly Relations Declaration.
115. Guyana v Suriname, [445].
116. Compromis, [35].
117. Charter art 2(3).
118. UNCLOS arts 58(2), 87, reflecting custom.
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deployment of naval vessels subjected the area of the Cargast to
interference inconsistent with the customary freedom of navigation in the
EEZ.119 As Bellezza ceased salvage of the Cargast after the Ritanian naval
patrols commenced,120 it can be inferred that these patrols interfered with
Amalea's salvage. Even if Ritania owned the artifacts and had a legal
interest in their protection, Amalea as owner of the Cargast, was still
entitled to access the wreck of the ship in order to recover its own
property.12 1 Therefore, Ritania's patrols infringed upon Amalea's freedom
of navigation by inhibiting Amalea's access to the Cargast.
4. Ritania cannot rely on any provision of the UCHC to justify its
deployment of naval vessels to the Cargast
The UCHC provides that a State Party may take emergency measures
to prevent any immediate danger being caused to underwater cultural
heritage on its continental shelf. 122 The Cargast is not on Ritania's
continental shelf. Even if Ritania has subsoil rights in the Malachi Gap
sufficient for the purposes of the UCHC, Ritania cannot invoke any right
under that convention as a non-party. Further, neither the text of the UCHC
nor its travaux prdparatoires indicate that this right was intended to be
available for exercise by third States. 123 Finally, as stated above, the UCHC
is not reflective of custom. 12 4
IV. AMALEA'S PURSUIT OF Luz INTO RITANIA'S UNCONTESTED EEZ, AND
HIS SUBSEQUENT ARREST, WERE IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A. Amalea's pursuit ofLuz was in compliance with the conventional
requirements for hot pursuit
States are prohibited from taking enforcement measures against
foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas, subject to limited exceptions,
which include the right of hot pursuit. Article 23 of the High Seas
Convention provides that hot pursuit of a foreign-flagged vessel from the
contiguous zone is lawful when five conditions are satisfied:
119. UNCLOS arts 58, 87, reflecting custom; Continental Shelf [34].
120. Clarifications, [8].
121. Salvage Convention arts 4, 5.
122. UCHC art 10(4).
123. UCHC art 10(4); Free Zones, 96; Chinkin (1993) 54-56.
124. Dromgoole (2013) 359, 367; Forrest (2010) 361.
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1. the competent authorities had 'good reason to believe'
that there was a 'violation of the rights for the protection of
which the [contiguous] zone was established';
2. the pursuing ship was a warship;
3. the pursuing ship 'satisfied itself by such practicable
means as [were] available' that the pursued ship was within the
contiguous zone;
4. the pursuing ship had given the pursued ship a signal to
stop; and
5. the pursuit was not interrupted.
The Icarus' pursuit of the Daedalus satisfied each of these conditions.
1. The competent Amalean authorities had good reason to believe that
there had been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the
contiguous zone was established
a. Amalean authorities had good reason to believe that the Daedalus had
violated Amalean immigration laws
The 'good reason' criterion does not require the competent authority to
have actual knowledge that a violation of laws or regulations has
occurred,125 only that it has reasonable suspicion of such a violation.126 The
relevant laws in this instance are Amalean immigration laws. The ACPS
alert stated that the Daedalus was 'stolen and persons on board are
suspected of human trafficking,'l 27 a prima facie violation of Amalean
immigration laws.
Amalea's suspicion of human trafficking was reasonable. Although the
basis for the suspicion that the Daedalus was engaged in human trafficking
is not disclosed, it is likely that this suspicion was based on information
provided by Ritanian authorities and the captain of the Rosehill. Ritanian
authorities were the most probable source of the information contained in
the alert as the Daedalus was a Ritanian-flagged vessel, Luz was a Ritanian
national and the Daedalus was first sighted from Ritania's uncontested
EEZ. Further, the brevity of the alert is consistent with contemporary
maritime communication practices 28 and cannot be relied upon by Ritania
to challenge the ACPS' suspicion of immigration offences. In that regard,
there is a presumption under general international law that 'public officers
125. O'Connell (1984) vol 2,1088; Annotated US Naval Operations Handbook, 3-22 n 77.
126. McDougal and Burke (1962) 896; Poulantzas (2002) 157.
127. Clarfications, [12].
128. IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases.
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perform their official duties and that their official acts are regular.'1 29 This
presumption of regularity applies to the ACPS officials who issued the
alert.
b. A contravention ofAmalean law in the contiguous zone, outside of
Amalea's territorial sea, was sufficient for the commencement of hot
pursuit
Article 23 of the High Seas Convention provides that pursuit from the
contiguous zone may be commenced if there has been 'a violation of the
rights for the protection of which the zone was established.'130 Article 24 of
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention empowers the coastal
State to exercise control within its contiguous zone to 'prevent' and
'punish' infringement of 'customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
regulations within [a State's] territory or territorial sea."3 1 Pursuit of the
Daedalus was commenced within Amalea's contiguous zone, which was
established in conformity with Article 24 of the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone Convention.'32
Although it is clear that hot pursuit may be commenced from the
contiguous zone, Article 23 of the High Seas Convention does not specify
where the violation giving rise to pursuit must have occurred. According to
O'Connell, 'on its face [Article 23] appears to allow for the right of hot
pursuit to commence from the contiguous zone when the pursued vessel has
breached a law of the coastal State there relating to one of the four
categories of laws that may be enacted for the contiguous zone."133 It is
recognised, however, that the cross-reference to Article 24 of the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention presents a problem of interpretations
as this article refers to violations within a State's territory or territorial
sea.134 In light of such ambiguity, recourse to the travaux prdparatoires is
necessary. 35
During the Geneva Conference, the Netherlands proposed an
amendment that would have expressly restricted pursuit from the
contiguous zone to violations occurring within the internal waters or
territorial sea of the coastal State.136 However, this formulation was
129. Frierdich & Co, 53; Cheng (1953) 305.
130. High Seas Convention art 23(1).
131. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention art 24(1).
132. Compromis, [45]; Clarifications, [3].
133. O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 1083 (emphasis added).
134. Fitzmaurice (1959) 115-117.
135. VCLTart31(2).
136. Official Records to the High Seas Convention, 142.
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overwhelmingly rejected. 137 Instead, the Conference adopted, 'by a
13813substantial majority, an alternative proposal3  which 'was offered to
make it clear, expressly and not by implication, that hot pursuit was
permissible for acts committed within the contiguous zone.'1 4 0 Even though
this formulation did not entirely remove the problem of interpretation
referred to above, the intention of the majority of delegations was
nonetheless clear.141 Further, as observed by O'Connell, 'the current of
opinion and practice is against [the] narrow technical view of the scope of
Article 23 and of customary law'.142 Amalea was therefore entitled to
commence pursuit of the Daedalus for its violation of immigration laws in
the contiguous zone.
c. Alternatively, the pursuit was justified on the basis that a violation of
Amalean immigration laws was about to be committed within its territorial
sea
Even if a narrow interpretation of Article 23 is adopted, restricting
pursuit to violations occurring within the territorial sea, Amalea's pursuit
was valid. During drafting, a proposal specifying that a 'violation' included
one which was 'about to be committed' 43 was considered to already be
encompassed within the scope of the provision.'" Therefore, the term
'violation' includes acts which are about to be committed. The Daedalus
was 'speeding' towards Amalea, had already entered Amalea's contiguous
zone and was suspected of human trafficking.145 In these circumstances, an
offence within Amalea's territorial sea was 'about to be' committed by the
Daedalus. Therefore, Amalea's pursuit was lawful.
2. The Icarus was a warship
As the Icarus was an Amalean Navy Fast Response Cutter under the
command of Captain Haddock, it was a warship.14 6
137. Official Records to the High Seas Convention, 9 1.
138. McDougal and Burke (1962) 922.
139. Official Records to the High Seas Convention, 121.
140. McDougal and Burke (1962) 923.
141. Oda (1962) 158; Poulantzas (2002) 164; McDougal and Burke (1962) 913.
142. O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 1084.
143. Summary ofComments by Governments (Regime ofthe High Seas), 40 (emphasis added).
144. ILC Yearbook, 1956, Summary Records, 49; Poulantzas (2002) 155; O'Connell (1984) vol
2, 1089.
145. Compromis, [44]-[45]; Clarifications, [12].
146. High Seas Convention art 8(2).
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3. The Icarus satisfied itself by such practicable means as were available
that the Daedalus was within Amalea's contiguous zone
The Icarus located the Daedalus on its radar as it drew within about 23
nm of Amalea's coastline, within Amalea's contiguous zone. 147 The
drafting history of the High Seas Convention indicates that the use of
modem technology, including radar, was a permissible means of
ascertaining a ship's location.14 8
4. The Icarus gave the Daedalus a signal to stop
When the Icarus was within visual range of the Daedalus, Captain
Haddock issued an order to stop over multiple radio frequencies. 149 Article
23 of the High Seas Convention does not expressly preclude the use of
radio signals. Nonetheless, the travaux prdparatoires to the convention
indicate a reluctance to consider radio signals as an acceptable signal to
stop.150 This reluctance was based on concerns that radio signals could be
issued over great distances and were therefore open to abuse by States.
Subsequent State practice'"' and the writings of jurists 5 2 have,
however, considered radio transmissions to be permissible signals to
stop.' 53 This reflects the increasing reliability of radio communications1 54
and their universal use by vessel operators.s15 Vessel operators have also
developed the practice of keeping records of radio transmission which
renders the use of radio signals less open to abuse. 1 6
Amalea is not required to establish that the Daedalus received the
radio broadcast, only that the signal was issued at a distance which enabled
it to be heard.'5 7 Ritania does not contest that the broadcast was issued and
that it was made when the vessels were in close range. 58 In any event, it is
147. Compromis, [45].
148. Official Records to the High Seas Convention, 80-82, 91, 141 (India's proposal, adopted in
part).
149. Compromis, [45].
150. Second Report of the Special Rapporteur (High Seas Regime) (1951) 89; Third Report of
the Special Rapporteur (High Seas Regime) (1952) 48.
151. Rv Mills; Volga; M/VSaiga.
152. Allen (1989) 323; Baird (2009) 10-11; Gilmore (1995) 956-958.
153. VCLTart 31(3)(b).
154. Baird (2009) 11.
155. Allen (1989) 323.
156. Baird (2009) 11.
157. High Seas Convention art 23(3); Allen (1989) 319.
158. Compromis, [45].
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implausible that the signal was not received by the Daedalus as it was
issued over several different radio frequencies commonly used by vessels in
the Strait of Malachi and because following the signal, the Daedalus
changed course away from the Amalean coast.15 9
5. The Icarus' pursuit of the Daedalus was uninterrupted
The Icarus' pursuit of the Daedalus was both 'hot' and uninterrupted.
The Icarus commenced pursuit of the Daedalus immediately upon locating
it within Amalea's contiguous zone and continued that pursuit until the
ships collided.
6. The entrance of the Daedalus into Ritania's EEZ did not preclude the
Icarus from continuing pursuit
The right of hot pursuit does not cease when the pursued vessel enters
another State's EEZ;16 0 it ceases only when the pursued vessel enters
another State's territorial sea.16 ' As the Daedalus never reached Ritania's
territorial sea, the Icarus' entrance into Ritania's EEZ did not preclude its
continuation of pursuit.
7. The Icarus did not use excessive force in arresting the Daedalus
The Icarus did not use force against the Daedalus. To the contrary,
Luz 'suddenly steered' the Daedalus 'straight towards' the Icarus '[i]n an
attempt to get the Icarus to veer away'. 62 Consequently, the sinking of the
Daedalus was caused by the actions of Luz, rather than the actions of the
Icarus. These circumstances can therefore be distinguished from the actions
of the pursuing vessels in the I'm Alone, Red Crusader and M/V Saiga
cases. Excessive force was not used in Luz's subsequent arrest on the
dinghy.
B. Amalea's pursuit ofLuz was in compliance with the requirements for
customary hot pursuit from the EEZ
Pursuit of the Daedalus commenced when it was at least 23 nm from
Amalea's coastline, within Amalea's EEZ.16 3 At custom, there is a right of
hot pursuit from the EEZ, the requirements of which are the same as those
159. Compromis, [45]-[46].
160. UNCLOS Commentary, vol 3,253,255.
161. High Seas Convention art 23(2).
162. Compromis, [46].
163. Compromis, [10], [15], [45].
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listed above, applying mutatis mutandis to violations of coastal State laws
and regulations in the EEZ. Amalea has the right to regulate and enforce
maritime safety and navigation in the EEZ for the protection of its EEZ
rights to the water column under the Malachi Gap Treaty. Accordingly, the
extension of Amalea's Penal Code to encompass negligent operation of a
seafaring vessel in the Malachi Gap was a lawful basis for the exercise of
hot pursuit.'" As the ACPS alert noted that the Daedalus was 'fleeing
Excelsior Island towards Amalea' 'creating a danger for other vessels', 65
there was a prima facie violation of Amalean laws applicable to navigation
in the Gap. Further, Amalea had a 'good reason' to believe that the
Daedalus had committed such violations; for instance it received a radio
transmission from the Rosehill's captain following the Rosehill incident
which was likely to have detailed the Daedalus' erratic movements.'66 As
detailed above, 167 the other requirements for pursuit were also satisfied.
Amalea was therefore entitled to commence pursuit from its EEZ in respect
of suspected navigational offences, and to continue that pursuit into
Ritania's uncontested EEZ where Luz was ultimately arrested.
C. Amalea's arrest ofLuz was in compliance with international law
1. The Icarus' lawful hot pursuit entitled it to arrest Luz
The right of hot pursuit under customary and conventional
international law encompasses a power to arrest the pursued ship at the
conclusion of pursuit.'68 As Amalea's pursuit of the Daedalus was a valid
pursuit, either from the contiguous zone, or the EEZ, it was entitled to arrest
Luz.
2. In the alternative, Amalea had adequate grounds to arrest Luz on
suspicion of piracy
Amalea had reasonable grounds to arrest Luz on suspicion of piracy.
Under Article 15 of the High Seas Convention, piracy includes illegal acts
of violence between two ships on the high seas for private ends.169 When
the Daedalus intentionally veered straight towards the Icarus, causing the
vessels to collide, this provided Captain Haddock with a reasonable
164. Clarifications, [47].
165. Compromis, [44]; Clarifications, [12].
166. Compromis, [42], [45].
167. Section IV.A.2-5 (applies mutatis mutandis to the EEZ).
168. UNCLOS art 105; Crawford (2012) 310.
169. UNCLOS art 5 8(2) reflecting custom.
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suspicion of piracy. Based on this unlawful act of violence alone, the Icarus
could arrest the Daedalus and bring it into port.
V. AMALEA HAD JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE AND CONVICT LUZ FOR
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ROSEHILL INCIDENT, AND
HAS NO OBLIGATION TO RETURN HIM TO RITANIA
A. Amalea's exercise ofjurisdiction over Luz was lawful, irrespective of
the lawfulness of his arrest
Even if Amalea unlawfully arrested Luz, the effect of the male captus
bene detentus principle is that Amalean courts were not precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over him.o70 This principle has received broad
acceptance in national courts 71 and international criminal tribunals.172 This
principle applies to unlawful arrests both on land and at sea. 173
Notwithstanding Ritania's protestations, Amalea was not precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over Luz. 174
B. No rule of international law prohibited Amalea's exercise of
jurisdiction
In accordance with Lotus, Amalea was entitled to exercise jurisdiction
to prosecute and convict Luz for criminal conduct in connection with the
Rosehill incident unless there was an applicable prohibitive rule of
international law.s75 Amalea's exercise of jurisdiction over Luz was not
prohibited by any such rule.
1. Ritania did not have exclusive flag-State jurisdiction
To exercise exclusive flag-State jurisdiction under Article 11 of the
High Seas Convention, Ritania must establish that Luz was the 'master' of a
Ritanian-flagged vessel and that the Rosehill grounding was an 'incident of
navigation'. First, the status of a master, as referred to in the High Seas
Convention, is only obtained after the relevant qualification, licensing or
170. Crawford (2012) 483; Oppenheim (1992) vol 1, 389; Selleck (1985) 239.
171. See generally Belgium: Geldof v Meulemeester and Steffen, 385; France: Barbie, 126;
Germany: Extradition (Jurisdiction), 349-350; Israel: Eichmann, 305-307; United States: Ker, 444;
Alvarez-Machain, 664-670.
172. See generally Dolananovi6, [57]-[80]; Milosevi6, [51]; Nikolic, [70], [95], [104].
173. Williams, 1090; Royal Caribbean Cruises, 16.
174. Alvarez-Machain, 667-668.
175. Lotus, 19; Arrest Warrant, 54 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Koojimans and
Buergenthal); Kosovo (Advisory Opinion), [79]-[84].
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certification scheme has been completed. 176 Article 11 has only been
considered in the context of masters with these professional qualifications.
There is no evidence that Luz had satisfied these regulatory requirements.
Second, to be an 'incident of navigation', the Rosehill grounding could not
'involve a criminal act in [any] circumstances.17 7 Subsequent agreement
between the parties to the High Seas Convention as to the interpretation of
'incident of navigation' clarifies that exclusive flag-State jurisdiction over
the master does not apply in cases of intentional (as opposed to accidental)
conduct.178 This interpretation is consistent with the purpose for which
Article 11 was enacted, which was to rectify the mischief created by Lotus,
a case which involved acts which were negligent but not intentional.'79 In
contrast to the circumstances of Lotus, Luz's conduct concerning the
Rosehill was intentional. Luz operated the Daedalus at an excessive speed,
failing to give way to a much larger ship which would have had difficulty
manoeuvring to avoid the smaller yacht. 80
2. The Amalean Penal Code does not contravene the Malachi Gap Treaty
or the EEZ regime
In addition to the specific customary EEZ rights reflected in UNCLOS,
coastal States have 'innate and unspecified rights' insofar as they are
necessary for the protection of those specific rights.'8 ' A State may be
entitled to regulate navigation if this is necessary for the protection and
preservation of natural resources in the EEZ, such as the protection of
fishing industries. 8 2 Exclusive flag-State jurisdiction does not exclude
Amalea's right as a coastal State to regulate navigation in a manner
consistent with the EEZ regime. 8 3
Amalea's customary EEZ entitlements are retained insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the Malachi Gap Treaty. The Malachi Gap Treaty
delineates jurisdiction within the Malachi Gap, so that Amalea has the
176. Dear and Kemp (2005) 358; Cartner, Fiske and Leiter (2009) § 1.0, § 6.2; Gold (2003) 3-
4.
177. Enrica Lexie, [94].
178. VCLT art 31(3)(b); IMO Casualty Investigation Code, [2.9]; UNCLOS Commentary, 94;
Kanehara (2011) 217-218.
179. Lotus, 19, 82 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore). See also Brierly (1958) 145-147;
Beckett (1927); Franconia, 98-99, 107, 158, 234; ILC Yearbook, 1956, vol Il 281.
180. Compromis, [41]-[42]; COLREGS, [3], [6], [18].
181. O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 577.
182. Oxman (1971) 260-264; Burke (1983) 608; Brown (1977) 334.
183. Robertson (1984) 880; Beckman and Davenport (2012) 11; UNCLOS Commentary, vol 2,
565.
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competence to 'explore, exploit and protect the natural resources of the
waters' of the Malachi Gap. To protect this maritime area and the Amalean
fishing vessels operating within the Malachi Gap, it was essential for
Amalea to regulate activities that posed a threat to seafaring vessels, and
those on board such vessels. Ritania does not prescribe similar laws in this
area, heightening the importance of Amalea's regulation. Moreover,
Amalea's assertion of jurisdiction here does not render the 'Malachi Gap or
any portion thereof' the sovereign territory of Amalea in contravention of
Article 12(c) of the Malachi Gap Treaty. As recognised in Lotus, 'the
territoriality of criminal law... is not an absolute principle of international
law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty'.184 Accordingly,
Amalea was not prohibited by the Malachi Gap Treaty from exercising
jurisdiction over navigational crimes within the Malachi Gap.
3. It would be non ultra petita for this Court to determine any issue
regarding Amalean jurisdiction unrelated to the Rosehill collision
The Court is confined to considering the legal points laid down by the
parties in the special agreement. 85 The respondent, in its prayer for relief,
has specifically asked the Court to adjudge and declare that 'Amalea was
without jurisdiction to try Luz in connection with the Rosehill collision'. It
therefore follows that the Court cannot make a ruling on Amalea's
jurisdiction to try Luz for offences unrelated to the Rosehill collision,
including those related to the Icarus collision.
C. Amalea can rely on permissive bases provided for in international law
to prosecute and convict Luz in connection with the Rosehill incident
Amalea did not require a permissive basis to exercise jurisdiction to
prosecute and convict Luz in connection with the Rosehill incident, as its
exercise of jurisdiction over the Rosehill did not conflict with the
sovereignty of Ritania.186 In the alternative, if Amalea did require a
permissive basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, Amalea can establish such a
basis for each offence.
1. Amalea had universal jurisdiction over Luz
As noted above, both at custom and in the High Seas Convention,'8 7
piracy includes any illegal act of violence or depredation committed for
184. Lotus, 20.
185. Rosenne (2006) vol 2, 578.
186. Cassese (2013) 50; Higgins (1994) 77.
187. Rayfise (2004) 53.
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private ends on the high seas or in the EEZ'88 against another ship.1 89 As
piracy is a continuous crime,190 ships already guilty of acts of piracy remain
'pirate ships' for as long as they remain under the control of the same
person.191
The Daedalus was stolen by Luz before the Rosehill incident
occurred.192 If the theft of the vessel occurred on the high seas, then the
Daedalus was a 'pirate vessel' from the moment it was stolen and
throughout its subsequent encounters with the Rosehill and Icarus. Luz's
actions were for private ends, as they were not 'State sponsored'. The
'illegal' character of his violent acts is to be determined by the 'courts of
the State which seizes [the] pirate ship'.194 Even if the theft of the Daedalus
did not occur on the high seas, the Daedalus' intentional 'ramming' of the
Icarus,195 the endangerment of vessels in the Malachi Gap, and murder of
the passengers on board the Rosehill, constituted piracy. The definition of
piracy was therefore satisfied, providing Amalea with universal jurisdiction
over Luz.
2. Amalea had flag-State jurisdiction over Luz because deaths occurred
on board the Rosehill
Under Article 6 of the High Seas Convention, Amalea, as the flag-
State of the Rosehill, had flag-State jurisdiction over all 127 deaths that
occurred on board the Rosehill.19 6 Although the subjective elements of the
offence of murder occurred on the Daedalus, the objective elements of the
offence of murder, as a matter of law, were completed on the Rosehill,
where the deaths occurred.19 7 Amalea's entitlement to assert jurisdiction
over the deaths of 127 passengers and crew on board derives not from a
'floating territory' argument,19' but from the special character of the flag-
State's 'regulatory responsibility for and jurisdiction over" 99 the 'internal
188. UNCLOS art 58(2).
189. High Seas Convention art 15; Bassouini (2001-2002) 110.
190. Reuland (1989) 1182.
191. High Seas Convention art 14.
192. Compromis, [42]. -
193. Guilfoyle (2009) 36-37.
194. UNCLOS Commentary, vol 2, 200.
195. Symmons (2011) 182.
196. MIVSaiga, [106].
197. Lotus, 82 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore); Franconia, 98-99; Kanehara (2011) 218.
198. Crawford (2012) 464; O'Connell (1984) vol 2, 661; First Report of the Special Rapporteur
(High Seas Regime) (1950) [2].
199. Crawford (2012) 464; Registration Convention arts 91-94.
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economy'200 of the ship. Amalea may therefore exercise flag-State
jurisdiction in relation to the deaths that occurred on board the Rosehill.
3. Amalea had passive personality jurisdiction over Luz due to the deaths
of Amalean nationals
As recognised by this Court, the passive personality principle 'today
meets with relatively little opposition' in relation to serious crimes.2 01
Claims based on the 'passive personality' principle are well established in
international law.202 As the State of nationality of 89 passengers who died
on board the Rosehill, and of the 10 passengers who died in the waters,203
Amalea may exercise passive personality jurisdiction in relation to their
deaths.
D. Amalea has no obligation to return Luz to Ritania
1. Amalea has no primary obligation to return Luz to Ritania
Ritania cannot invoke any customary obligation or conventional
provision, such as an extradition treaty, to require Luz's repatriation to
Ritania. Ritania's request for Luz's return does not create any primary
obligation for Amalea to comply.
2. Amalea has no secondary obligation to return Luz to Ritania
Amalea has not contravened any of its obligations and thus has no
obligation to make any form of reparation, including repatriation.20 4
3. Alternatively, Amalea is not obliged to return Luz to Ritania as it is
materially impossible
Amalea concedes that if it has committed an internationally wrongful
act, it is required to make full reparation and that restitution is the primary
form of reparation. 205 However, Amalea is not obliged to make restitution
and reinstate the situation before the internationally wrongful act was
200. Crawford (2012) 464; Churchill and Lowe (1999) 66-67.
201. Arrest Warrant, [47] (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal).
202. McCarthy (1989-1990) 308-312 (France, Israel, Turkey, US); Third Restatement, § [402];
Australia: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Pt 5.4; Benitez, 1316; Yunis, 899; Eichmann, [11].
203. Compromis, [43]; Clarifications, [9].
204. Factory at Chorzdw (Jurisdiction), 21.
205. ASR arts 34-35; Factory at Chorzdw (Merits), 29.
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committed if restitution would be 'materially impossible' .206 Restitution is
materially impossible in these circumstances, as Amalea is entitled to
incarcerate Luz for criminal offences in connection with the Icarus, which
are unrelated to the Rosehill collision. Return of Luz would prevent Amalea
from exercising its entitlement to incarcerate him for the full length of his
sentence for crimes concerning the Icarus.2 07 Further, if Amalea's exercise
of its jurisdiction to prosecute and convict Luz in connection with the
Rosehill incident constituted an internationally wrongful act, Amalea could
reinstate the situation before that act occurred by releasing Luz, rather than
returning him to Ritania.208 Therefore, even if Amalea is required to make
reparation to Ritania, repatriation is not the appropriate remedy in this case.
206. ASR art 35(a).
207. Clarifications, [10].
208. Moore (1906) vol 7, 1091.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Amalea respectfully requests the Court to:
I. DECLARE that Ritania's conduct with respect to the
development of Excelsior Island was in contravention of international law
and that Ritania is liable to compensate Amalea for economic losses caused
by the landslide;
II. DECLARE that Amalea has exclusive ownership of the wreck of
the Cargast and all artifacts recovered from it, and Ritania's deployment of
naval patrol vessels to the site of the Cargast contravened international law;
III. DECLARE that Amalea's pursuit of Luz into Ritania's
uncontested EEZ, and his subsequent arrest, were in compliance with
international law; and
IV. DECLARE that Amalea had jurisdiction to prosecute and convict
Luz for criminal conduct in connection with the Rosehill incident, and has
no obligation to return him to Ritania.
